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Abstract
A Cournot oligopoly with at least three firms is considered, where one of the firms has a
cost−reducing innovation. A general version of royalty contract is proposed, and it is shown
that this contract enables the innovator firm to earn the monopoly profit with the reduced
cost.
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Consider an oligopolistic industry where each ﬁrm produces with an iden-
tical marginal cost. Now suppose that a cost-reducing innovation has taken
place and the owner of the innovation wants sell it to the ﬁrms. How much are
the ﬁrms willing to pay to the owner for the innovation? Is it possible for the
owner to come up with a selling mechanism such that he reaps all the beneﬁts
of the innovation? This note shows that if the owner of the innovation is one
of the ﬁrms in the industry, then there is a simple contract that enables him
to earn the monopoly proﬁt with the reduced cost.
The relation between market structure and incentives for innovation was
ﬁrst explored by Arrow (1962). There is a signiﬁcant number of papers consid-
ering various aspects of licensing of innovation. We refer to Kamien (1992) for
an excellent survey of these issues. The interaction between the owner of the
innovation (the innovator) and the ﬁrms has been modelled as a three-stage
game where the innovator acts as a Stackelberg leader and announces a selling
mechanism in the ﬁrst stage. In the next stage, the ﬁrms simultaneously decide
whether or not to buy the innovation, and the set of buyers become commonly
known at the end of the second stage. In the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms compete,
where the buyers of the innovation have the reduced cost, and all other ﬁrms
operate with the old cost. In the literature, three standard licensing policies,
viz., ﬁxed upfront fee, per-unit uniform royalty, and auction, have been con-
sidered. It has been shown by Wang (1998) in the context of a duopoly, and
by Kamien and Tauman (2002) under a oligopolistic set-up that the nature of
the optimal licensing policies could be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent if the innovator is
one of the ﬁrms instead of being an outsider to the industry.
Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) have proposed a general licensing policy,
where an outsider innovator can earn a payoﬀ that is suﬃciently close to the
maximum industry proﬁt that can be made with the innovation. This policy,
referred by Kamien (1992) as the “chutzpah” mechanism, is complicated and
proceeds in a certain number of stages. In this note, we show that when the
innovator is one of the ﬁrms, there is a simple policy based on royalty by
which the innovator can earn the monopoly proﬁt with the reduced cost. The
underlying reason is that the very fact that the innovator is an incumbent
ﬁrm acts as an important instrument in the strategic interaction between the
innovator and other ﬁrms. The rest of this note is organized as follows. We
1present the model and our main proposition in Section 2. We conclude in
Section 3.
2. The Model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n+1 ﬁrms producing the same product.
The ﬁrms are denoted by 0,1,...,n. The ﬁrms compete in quantities. For
i = 0,1,...,n, let qi be the quantity produced by ﬁrm i and let Q =
Pn
i=0 qi.
The inverse demand function of the industry is linear and is given by Q = a−p,
for p ≤ a and Q = 0, otherwise. Initially, all n+1 ﬁrms produce at the identical
marginal cost c, where 0 < c < a. Firm 0 has a cost-reducing innovation,
which reduces the marginal cost from c to c − ε, where 0 < ε < c. Firm 0,
the innovator, considers licensing the innovation to some other ﬁrms in the
industry. We then have the following three-stage licensing game.
In stage 1, the innovator announces a licensing contract. In stage 2, n ﬁrms
in {1,...,n} simultaneously decide whether to accept the contract or not, and
the set of licensees become commonly known at the end of the second stage.
In stage 3, all n + 1 ﬁrms compete in quantities, where the marginal cost of
the innovator and each licensee ﬁrm is c−ε and that of each non-licensee ﬁrm
is c. The licensees pay to the innovator according to the licensing contract.
Before proceeding further, let us mention the notion of drastic innovation,
due to Arrow (1962). An innovation is said to be drastic if the monopoly
price under the reduced cost does not exceed the competitive price under the
old cost; otherwise, it is non-drastic. In the model under consideration, an
innovation is drastic if a − c ≤ ε, and it is non-drastic if a − c > ε. It is
immediately seen that when the innovation is drastic and the innovator is one
of the ﬁrms, all other ﬁrms drop out, and, the innovator earns the monopoly
proﬁt with the reduced cost. So, the issue under question is interesting only
when the innovation is non-drastic. Throughout this note, we assume that the
innovation is non-drastic, that is, a−c > ε. Our main proposition is based on
a general version of the royalty contract, which can be described as follows.
General Royalty Contract. For a general royalty contract, the rate of
royalty depends on the number of licensees. Speciﬁcally, a typical contract Cr
is given by an n-tuple hr(1),...,r(n)i, where for m = 1,...,n, r(m) denotes
the per-unit linear royalty that each licensee has to pay when the number of
licensees is m. When r(i) = r for all i, we have the usual royalty contract.
2Proposition 1. Let n ≥ 2 and (a − c) > ε. There exists a general royalty
contract Cr = hr(1),...,r(n)i such that the following holds for the three-stage
licensing game.
[1] If the innovator oﬀers the contract Cr, it is weakly dominant for every ﬁrm to
accept the contract. Consequently, in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium,
every ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...,n} becomes a licensee.
[2] When there are n licensees, then, every ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...,n} ﬁnds it optimal
not to produce. So, in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the innovator
is the only producer, and he earns the monopoly proﬁt (a − c + ε)2/4.
Proof. There is more than one contract that satisﬁes the proposition. We shall
prove the proposition by providing a speciﬁc contract. Consider the contract
Cr = hr(1),...,r(n)i, where
r(m) =
c − a + (m + 1)ε
m
, for m ∈ {1,...,n−1}, and r(n) =
a − c + ε
2
. (1)
Suppose there are m licensees, for m ∈ {0,1,...,n}. From symmetry it follows
that any two licensees will produce the same quantity and earn the same payoﬀ.
So will any two non-licensee ﬁrms. Let Π0(m), ΠL(m) and ΠN(m) denote the
payoﬀ of ﬁrm 0, a licensee and a non-licensee respectively under the contract Cr
when there are m licensees. To prove [1], then, we need to show the following.
ΠL(m) ≥ ΠN(m − 1) for all m ∈ {1,...,n}, and,
ΠL(m) > ΠN(m − 1) for at least one m ∈ {1,...,n}. (2)
In what follows, we show that ΠL(m) > ΠN(m − 1) for all m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}
and ΠL(n) = ΠN(n−1). First consider the case when there is no licensee. For




qj)q0 −(c−ε)q0; Πi = (a−
n X
j=0
qj)qi −cqi for i ∈ {1,...,n}. (3)
Solving for optimal quantities, from (3) we get the following.
q0 =
a − c + (n + 1)ε
n + 2
,qi =
a − c − ε
n + 2
for i ∈ {1,...,n}. (4)
Further, for i ∈ {0,1,...,n}, Πi = q2
i. Hence,
ΠN(0) =




3Next, consider the case when there are m licensees, for m ∈ {1,...,n−1}. Let
{1,...,m} be the set of licensees. Then,
Π0 = (a −
n X
j=0




Πi = (a −
n X
j=0
qj)qi − (c − ε + r(m))qi for i ∈ {1,...,m}, and,
Πi = (a −
n X
j=0
qj)qi − cqi for i ∈ {m + 1,...,n}. (6)
Solving for optimal quantities, from (6) we get the following.
q0 =




a − c + (n − m + 1)ε − (n − m + 2)r(m)
n + 2
for i ∈ {1,...,m}, and,
qi =
a − c − (m + 1)ε + mr(m)
n + 2
for i ∈ {m + 1,...,n}. (7)
Replacing the value of r(m) from (1) in (7) we conclude that
q0 = ε,qi =
a − c − ε
m
for i ∈ {1,...,m},qi = 0 for i ∈ {m + 1,...,n}. (8)
Further, for i ∈ {1,...,n}, Πi = q2
i, so that from (8) we conclude the following.
ΠL(m) =
a − c − ε
m
2
,ΠN(m) = 0 for m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. (9)
Since a − c > ε, we conclude from (9) that ΠL(m) > ΠN(m − 1) for all
m ∈ {2,...,n − 1}. Further, from (5) and (9) it follows that
ΠL(1) − ΠN(0) =
(n + 1)(n + 3)(a − c − ε)2
(n + 2)2 > 0. (10)
Thus, we have shown that ΠL(m) > ΠN(m − 1) for all m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
Now we show that ΠL(n) = ΠN(n − 1). Let us consider the case when every
ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...,n} is a licensee. In that case,
Π0 = (a −
n X
j=0




4Πi = (a −
n X
j=0
qj)qi − (c − ε + r(n))qi for i ∈ {1,...,n}. (11)
Solving for optimal quantities, from (11) we get the following.
q0 =
a − c + ε + nr(n)
n + 2
,qi =
a − c + ε − 2r(n)
n + 2
for i ∈ {1,...,n}. (12)
Recall from (1) that r(n) = (a − c + ε)/2. Replacing the value of r(n) in (12)
we conclude that
q0 =
a − c + ε
2
,qi = 0 for i ∈ {1,...,n}. (13)
From (9) and (12) we conclude that ΠL(n) = ΠN(n − 1) = 0. This proves [1].
Also, from (13) it follows that under the contract Cr, when there are n licensees,
only the innovator produces, and he earns the monopoly proﬁt (a − c + ε)2/4.
This proves [2].
Remark. When n = 1, the innovator cannot earn the monopoly proﬁt. With
n ≥ 2, the innovator generates competition among other ﬁrms, and, in the
process extracts all the surplus. The element of competition is absent with
n = 1. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm 1 can always ensure the payoﬀ (a−c−ε)2/9. Thus, the
maximum payoﬀ that the innovator can get is [(a−c+ε)2/4−(a−c−ε)2/9].
This can be achieved with a royalty plus ﬁxed fee contract hr,fi, where r
is suﬃciently large (which ensures that the licensee does not produce), and
f = −(a−c−ε)2/9 (ﬁrm 1 is paid −f so that it is indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting the contract).
3. Conclusion
In this note, we have shown that in a Cournot oligopoly with at least three
ﬁrms, if the owner of cost-reducing innovation is an incumbent ﬁrm, there
is a general version of royalty contract that enables the innovator to earn the
monopoly proﬁt with the reduced cost. Our result depends on two factors: ﬁrst,
the innovator is one of the ﬁrms, which implies that irrespective of the other
ﬁrms’ decisions, there always exists an eﬃcient ﬁrm in form of the innovator.
Second, there must be at least two ﬁrms other than the innovator. With just
one more ﬁrm, the innovator cannot generate the kind of competition that
drives our result.
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